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Deference to State Courts in Federal
Interpleader Actions
The salutary purpose of the Federal Interpleader Act1 is to
avoid multiple litigation and the consequent possibility of inconsis-
tent results. It would surprise a layman to learn' that, while the
statutory remedy continues to be available to litigants in the fed-
eral courts, parallel suits in state courts, involving the same parties
and issues, often proceed simultaneously.4 This situation is anoma-
lous in light of the policy of the Act of avoiding multiple litigation.
It results in part from the confusion engendered by recent deci-
sions of the Supreme Court that have attempted to delineate the
scope of judicial discretion to enter a stay in a suit properly before
the federal court.5 Another cause is the unwillingness to enjoin
proceedings in state courts, even though such injunctions are ex-
pressly authorized by the Interpleader Act.'
This comment argues that, in the situation described above, it
is a sound exercise of discretion for a federal judge to stay or dis-
miss the federal proceeding in deference to the parallel state suit.
Such a result is particularly desirable in view of the increasingly
unmanageable workload of the federal courts.'
1 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 1397, 2361 (1976).
2 See generally Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 412 (1939); Zellen v. Second New Haven
Bank, 454 F. Supp. 1359, 1365-66 (D. Conn. 1978); 2 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 551, at 227 (rev. ed. 1961); Hazard & Moskovitz, An Historical
and Critical Analysis of Interpleader, 52 CALIF. L. REv. 706, 751 (1964).
3 T. B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 824 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.).
" E.g., Boston Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Balbin, 591 F.2d 1040 (5th Cir. 1979); Ungar v.
Mandell, 471 F.2d 1163 (2d Cir. 1972).
1 E.g., Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655 (1978). Professor Currie deems the
case "inconclusive." D. CURRImE, FEDERAL CouRTs 99 (2d ed. Supp. 1978); accord, 24 VILL. L.
REv. 815 (1979). The subsequent history of the Will case offers ample evidence of the confu-
sion generated by the Court's opinions. See Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Will, 586 F.2d 12 (7th
Cir. 1978); Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Reins. Co., 459 F. Supp. 859 (N.D. Ill.
1978), afl'd, 600 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1979).
6 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1976).
See, e.g., Klein v. Walston & Co., 432 F.2d 936, 937 (2d Cir. 1970); Sheran & Isaac-
man, State Cases Belong in State Courts, 12 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1 (1970).
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I. THE FEDERAL INTERPLEADER ACT
The Federal Interpleader Act substantially resembles its his-
torical antecedent, the equitable procedural device known as a bill
of interpleader.8 The policy underlying the development and for-
mulation of the remedy is the avoidance of a multiplicity of suits
over a single res, fund, or claim, and the consequent possibility of
inconsistent results.
The Act was passed in response to the 1916 decision of the
Supreme Court in New York Life Insurance Co. v. Dunlevy,10
which affirmed a judgment requiring the insurance company to pay
the full cash surrender value of a life insurance policy to the as-
signee of the policyholder. To the chagrin of New York Life, how-
ever, a prior state suit to which the assignee could not be joined
had resulted in a judgment for the assignor on the same policy.
This injustice made it plain that, because of limitations on state
service of process, together with the fact that adverse claimants to
a fund often do not reside in the same jurisdiction," state courts
were incapable of affording full relief in those cases in which a
stakeholder was faced with inconsistent claims pursued by claim-
ants of diverse citizenship.
Responding with considerable alacrity to Dunlevy, Congress
enacted the Federal Interpleader Act a mere eight months after
the case was decided.1 2 The scope of the 1917 Act shows that its
formulation and passage directly resulted from the imposition of
double liability on the New York Life Insurance Company. The
ability to file original bills of interpleader was restricted to "any
insurance company or fraternal or beneficiary society."1 Because
the Dunlevy situation arises only when a state court is precluded,
by reason of diverse citizenship, from compelling joinder of all
claimants, the Act included, as a necessary incident, a provision for
nationwide service of process.1 The principal function of the 1917
Act thus was jurisdictional: it expanded the jurisdiction of the fed-
eral courts to allow relief by interpleader, whenever diversity
among the claimants rendered full relief in a state court
problematic.
£ See 4 J. Pom.iRoy, A TREATISE ON EQurrY JURISPRUDENCE § 1320 (5th ed. 1941).
'Id.
10 241 U.S. 518 (1916).
See generally S. REP. No. 660, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1916).
'2 Act of Feb. 22, 1917, ch. 113, 39 Stat. 929 (repealed 1926). Dunlevy was decided June
5, 1916; the statute was approved Feb. 22, 1917.
23 Id.
14 Id.
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Although passage of the Act immediately alleviated the con-
cern caused by Dunlevy, unresolved questions remained. The util-
ity of the equitable bill of interpleader had been severely impaired
by four judicially created prerequisites to relief.15 Given their clas-
sic formulation by Pomeroy, 8 these "requirements" were applied
mechanically so as to deny interpleader in some cases where a
stakeholder was faced with the possibility of multiple or inconsis-
tent liabilities.17
Having concluded that it was of primary importance to rid the
statutory remedy of "antiquarian and metaphysical incrusta-
tions,"18 Professor Chafee sought to ensure that the Act was not
interpreted as embodying Pomeroy's four requirements. As com-
mentator, draftsman, and advisor, he had a profound effect on
Congress.19 That his advice was sought and closely followed each
time the Act was revised" is widely recognized.21 Indeed, Congress
11 Chafee, Modernizing Interpleader, 30 YALE L.J. 814, 821-22 (1921).
16 4 J. PomRoy, supra note 8, §§ 1322-1326. The four prerequisites were (1) that the
same thing, debt, or duty be claimed by both or all parties from whom relief was sought; (2)
all adverse titles must be dependent on or derived from a common source; (3) the plaintiff
in interpleader must not have any interest in the subject matter of the suit; and (4) the
plaintiff must be merely a stakeholder, indifferent to the claimants.
'7 See generally Chafee, supra note 15.
18 Id. at 822.
16 Professor Chafee wrote a series of articles on federal interpleader: Modernizing In-
terpleader, 30 YALE L.J. 814 (1921); Interstate Interpleader, 33 YALE L.J. 685 (1924); Inter-
pleader in the United States Courts (pts. 1-2), 41 YALE L.J. 1134, 42 YALE L.J. 41 (1932);
The Federal Interpleader Act of 1936 (pts. 1-2), 45 YALE L.J. 963, 1161 (1936); Federal
Interpleader Since the Act of 1936, 49 YALE L.J. 377 (1940). Professor Chafee's influence in
this area also derived from his role as advisor to the section on insurance law of the Ameri-
can Bar Association; indeed, his report to that body in 1933 contained a proposed draft for
the statutory revision that was substantially the same as the one approved by Congress in
1936. Cf. Seeburger, The Federal Long-Arm: The Uses of Diversity, or T'ain't So, McGee,
10 IND. L. REv. 480, 496 & n.63 (1977) (Chafee drafted the 1936 amendments).
"o Act of Feb. 22, 1917, ch. 113, 39 Stat. 929 (repealed 1926); Act of Feb. 25, 1925, ch.
317, 43 Stat. 976 (repealed 1926); Act of May 8, 1926, ch. 273, 44 Stat. 416 (repealed 1936);
S. Con. Res. No. 16, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 44 Stat. 1979 (1926); Act of Jan. 20, 1936, ch. 13,
49 Stat. 1096 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 1397, 2361 (1976)). The Act was
"amended" again in 1948 as part of the revision of the Judicial Code, Act of June 25, 1948,
ch. 646, 62 Stat. 931 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1-2906 (1976, Supp. 1 1977 & Supp. II
1978). The accompanying Senate Report stated that "[g]reat care has been exercised to
make no changes in existing law which would not meet with substantially unanimous ap-
proval." S. REP. No. 1559, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1948). Since the 1948 changes in the
Interpleader Act were cosmetic, the 1936 revision may be regarded as the final substantive
change in the Act.
21 See, e.g., 2 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, supra note 2, § 551, at 226.
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expressly acknowledged its reliance on his work.22 Federal inter-
pleader was given its current formulation when the Judicial Code
was revised in 1948.23 The Act now represents a minor triumph of
the legal imagination: it is a sensible, pragmatic response to the
problems of double liability and multiple suits. 24
II. THE ABSOLUTE RIGHT DOCTRINE AND THE
AVOIDANCE OF DUPLICATIVE LITIGATION
The law regarding the propriety of a federal court stay or dis-
missal in deference to parallel state court litigation is undergoing a
metamorphosis. 25 Whether this process will be completed is still in
doubt, however, because the few Supreme Court decisions dealing
with the issue not only are marked by a lack of clarity,"6 but for
the most part have been rendered by a closely divided Court with a
vigorous dissent.7 While in the past a plaintiff who had properly
invoked federal jurisdiction was regarded as having an "absolute
right" to have the lawsuit heard in the forum,2 8 recent decisions
suggest that, at least in certain classes of cases, it is within the
discretion of the district court to stay or dismiss the suit in defer-
ence to pending state court proceedings.29
22 S. REP. No. 1417, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934).
2 Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 931 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1-2906
(1976, Supp. I 1977 & Supp. H 1978)).
2, "Interpleader possesses on first acquaintance an attractiveness which is not exceeded
by any other remedy known to the law. 'The mere statement of the principle,' declared Sir
James Willes, 'shows its justice.'" Chafee, supra note 15, at 814 (footnote omitted) (quoting
Evans v. Wright, 13 W.R. 468 (Ch. 1865)).
25 Compare Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959) with
Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943).
2" See, e.g., Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655 (1978); Colorado River Water
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817-20 (1976). With respect to Colorado
River, Professor Currie notes that "I have viewed Colorado River as expanding the Court's
willingness to allow federal courts to refuse to hear cases within their jurisdiction .... An
interesting comment, however, argues that Colorado River actually narrowed the category of
dismissals or stays in deference to state court proceedings." D. CURRIE, supra note 5, at 98
(citing Comment, Federal Court Stays and Dismissals in Deference to Parallel State Court
Proceedings: The Impact of Colorado River, 44 U. CH. L. REv. 641 (1977)). Two treatises
agree that the matter is unsettled. 1A J. MOORE, FEDEAL PRACTICE 0.203[4], at 2141 (2d
ed. 1979); C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF no LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTs § 52, at 228 (3d ed. 1976).
27 See, e.g., Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655 (1978). Three Justices joined in
the opinion of Justice Rehnquist; Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment; and the
Chief Justice and two others joined in the dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan.
's See text and notes at notes 30-42 infra.
z' See text and notes at notes 43-65 infra.
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A. The Absolute Right Doctrine-and Exceptions
The traditional view of the absolute right doctrine derives
from the dictum of Chief Justice Marshall:
It is most true, that this court will not take jurisdiction if
it should not: but it is equally true that it must take jurisdic-
tion, if it should .... We have no more right to decline the
exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that
which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to
the constitution.3
The ineluctable result of this reasoning is that, once having prop-
erly invoked federal jurisdiction, the plaintiff has an absolute right
to have the cause decided by that court. The federal courts there-
fore have a correlative duty to exercise the jurisdiction conferred
upon them. The dispositive factor is the congressional determina-
tion, as manifested in the relevant jurisdictional statute, that a
given class of plaintiffs is to be allowed access to the federal courts.
This reasoning, based on the general constitutional allocation of
governmental functions,81 does not distinguish among the numer-
ous specific grants of federal jurisdiction.
There is, however, no such thing as an "absolute" right. Ac-
cordingly, it is not surprising that the right to litigate in federal
courts has been qualified by several categories of exceptions.
1. The Exception of Duplicative In Rem Suits. It was estab-
lished earlys that the distinction between suits that are in rem
and those that are in personam necessitated a qualification of the
absolute right doctrine. When a suit is in rem, the first court to
gain jurisdiction over the res is said to have exclusive jurisdiction;
no other court, whether federal or state, can then adjudicate the
proper disposition of that res.3 3 Thus, only if parallel suits are in
personam is there danger of duplicative litigation.
Interpleader suits can be either in rem or in personam,34 de-
so Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821). One commentator notes that
the theory represented by these dicta has "gained respectability through repetition." Note,
Power to Stay Federal Proceedings Pending Termination of Concurrent State Litigation,
59 YALE L.J. 978, 980 (1950).
3' U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1 & 2.
3" See Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 134-36 (1941). The in rem ex-
ception derives from Hagan v. Lucas, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 400 (1836).
3 See, e.g., Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 230 (1922).
See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Dumpson, 194 F. Supp. 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1961)
(interpleader in personam); Flanagan v. Marvel, 94 F. Supp. 145 (D. Minn. 1950) (inter-
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pending on whether the stakeholder is faced with inconsistent
claims to property in possession, or to a chose in action. Several
courts have reasoned that because federal interpleader requires
that the stakeholder deposit the money or property in controversy
"into the registry of the court,"3 5 therefore all interpleader suits
are in rem.36 In any event, when a state court has jurisdiction over
tangible property that is the subject of controversy, a federal court
will not entertain a suit seeking disposition of the same property,
despite the supposed absolute right of the party invoking federal
jurisdiction.
When a federal court dismisses a suit because a state court has
prior jurisdiction over the res, it could be argued that jurisdiction
was lacking entirely. In the alternative, such a dismissal can be
viewed as a refusal to exercise a jurisdiction that has been properly
invoked. In either case, the accepted treatment of such suits indi-
cates that, under proper circumstances, the absolute right
doctrine may yield in order to facilitate rational judicial ad-
ministration.
2. Abstention as an Exception to the Absolute Right Doc-
trine. In accord with principles of comity and federalism, the Su-
preme Court has delineated certain classes of cases in which, de-
spite the absolute right doctrine, the federal courts may abstain
from the exercise of a properly invoked jurisdiction.
First, abstention may be appropriate when a case presents a
federal constitutional issue that might be mooted or presented in a
different posture by a prior state court construction of an applica-
ble but unclear state law. 7 This category is commonly referred to
pleader in rem), appeal dismissed, 189 F.2d 966 (8th Cir. 1951). But see Hanna v. Stedman,
230 N.Y. 326, 335, 130 N.E. 566, 569 (1921) (interpleader never in rem). See generally An-
not., 17 A.L.R. Fed. 447 (1973). For the classic statement of the doctrine that when a state
court has taken jurisdiction of a res, a federal court must decline jurisdiction, see Princess
Lida v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 465-67 (1939) (citing Pennsylvania Gen. Cas. Co. v. Penn-
sylvania, 294 U.S. 189, 195 (1935)). In this situation the state court may enjoin further pro-
ceedings in the federal court, 305 U.S. at 467, though the rule generally is contrary. Donovan
v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408 (1964).
28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(2) (1976).
E.g., Cramer v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 91 F.2d 141, 145 (8th Cir.) (where pro-
ceeds of insurance policies paid into court, case resembles a suit in rem), cert. denied, 302
U.S. 739 (1937); Glasser v. Rogers, 59 F. Supp. 986, 988 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub nom. Glasser v.
Wessel, 152 F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 1945) (trust located in state as basis for state in rem jurisdic-
tion), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 839 (1946).
37 E.g., County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 189 (1959); Railroad
Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). See also Colorado River Water Conservation
Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976).
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as Pullman abstention.8 Second, a federal court may decide that
abstention is appropriate if "the exercise of federal review in [this]
case and in similar cases would be disruptive of state efforts to
establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial
public concern.""9 The third category of abstention extends to
those cases in which the parties have an adequate remedy at law in
a pending state court proceeding to which the state is a party, or at
least in which the state has an interest analogous to its interest in
the prosecution of criminal cases."
It should be noted that courts and commentators are not in
substantial agreement concerning the appropriate terminology.41 It
is adequate for purposes of this comment to use the term "absten-
tion" in a generic sense to describe the situations just mentioned in
which a federal court refuses to hear a case properly before it. This
usage is consistent with that of the Supreme Court in Colorado
River Water Conservation District v. United States.42
B. The New Approach: Stays or Dismissals for Reasons of Wise
Judicial Administration
The previous section illustrates the traditional approach when
a federal court is asked to stay its hand despite the existence of
jurisdiction over the suit: the case will proceed to judgment unless
it falls within one of the exceptions to the absolute right doctrine.
The following discussion will demonstrate that a further inquiry by
the court is permissible even when the federal suit is within
neither the in rem justification for the avoidance of jurisdiction,
nor any one of the abstention categories. Thus, when reasons of
" The designation derives from the seminal case, Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312
U.S. 496 (1941).
30 Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976).
This category derives from Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943), and Alabama Pub.
Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951). Suits of this sort generally involve
challenges to state regulatory programs. See generally Comment, Abstention by Federal
Courts in Suits Challenging State Administrative Decisions: The Scope of the Burford
Doctrine, 46 U. CHI. L. Rav. 971 (1979). See also Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 391
U.S. 593 (1968).
40 E.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
4 See C. WmHT, supra note 26, § 52, at 218 (four categories of abstention); Note,
Federal Intervention in Ongoing State Proceedings: Expansion of an Abstention Doctrine,
25 DRAE L. REv. 482, 483 (1975) (six categories); Comment, Post-Younger Excesses in the
Doctrine of Equitable Restraint: A Critical Analysis, 1976 DuKF. L.J. 523, 526 & n.15 (dif-
ferentiating abstention from equitable restraint); 8 CUM. L. REv. 589, 590 n.9 (1977) (distin-
guishing between abstention and "nonintervention").
42 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
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wise judicial administration outweigh the obligation of the federal
courts to decide cases properly before them, cases are legitimately
stayed or dismissed. Such an inquiry requires a balancing of rele-
vant factors, an operation analytically distinct from that involved
when the issue is the propriety of abstention, which requires only a
determination that the relevant characteristics are present.
Here again there is a terminological difficulty. Some commen-
tators think that this category of cases constitutes a fourth
branch3 of the abstention doctrine. For purposes of simplicity, the
term "abstention" will be used here with the under standing that
the generic sense is meant. It should be borne in mind, however,
that the analysis required with respect to this fourth type of "ab-
stention" is fundamentally different from that employed when
considering whether abstention is appropriate for any of the rea-
sons previously discussed.
1. The Pedigree of the Balancing Approach. The origins of
abstention for reasons of wise judicial administration lie in three
cases widely separated in both time and subject matter. Analysis of
the cases, however, yields a common denominator that serves as
the theoretical underpinning of this fourth category of abstention.
In the first case, Langnes v. Green," a personal injury claim
had been filed in state court against a shipowner, whose response
was to petition a federal court for limitation of liability. Although
the federal court clearly had jurisdiction" and the state court
could not determine the right to limit liability, the Supreme Court
held that the federal court should have stayed its hand:
[T]o remit the cause to the state court would be to preserve
the rights of both parties. . . .[T]he district court ... should
[have permitted] the cause to proceed in the state court, re-
taining, as a matter of precaution, the petition for a limitation
of liability to be dealt with in the possible but. . . unlikely
event that the right of petitioner to a limited liability might
be brought into question in the state court ....
The Court thus balanced the right of the shipowner to sue in fed-
eral court against the benefits to be derived from allowing the state
suit to proceed, and found the scales tipped in favor of the latter.
43 C. WRIGHT, supra note 26, at 218.
44 282 U.S. 531 (1931).
45 46 U.S.C. § 185 (1976).
Is 282 U.S. at 541-42.
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This is arguably a special case because of the clause in the statute
"saving to suitors ' 47 all common law remedies, thus allowing jury
trials in state court, whereas federal admiralty jurisdiction does
not provide for a jury. Nevertheless, the case is important for its
demonstration of the Court's willingness to consider, on a prag-
matic basis, which forum could best provide for the interests of the
parties.
In Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd.,"8 a suit
in admiralty between foreigners, the Supreme Court expressly re-
jected Chief Justice Marshall's dictum in Cohens,'9 and said that it
was withi the discretion of the district court to refuse to retain
jurisdiction: "Obviously, the proposition that a court having juris-
diction must exercise it, is not universally true . . . .Courts of eq-
uity and of law . ..ocassionally [sic] decline, in the interest of
justice, to exercise jurisdiction . . .,.
The Court found that the "interest of justice" permitted the
district court to relegate the parties to their home forum. Such a
result was acceptable because it took into account both judicial
economy, in that the court could thereby avoid deciding difficult
questions of foreign law, and convenience to the litigants, who, it
was thought, could pursue the litigation more expeditiously at
home.51 Further proof of the Court's approval of balancing such
factors is its citation to an article on forum non conveniens that
favored just such a balancing. 52
In Brilihart v. Excess Insurance Co. of America,5" the Su-
preme Court held that a suit brought under the Declaratory Judg-
ments Act 54 could properly be dismissed when parallel litigation
was pending in a state court. "Ordinarily it would be uneconomical
as well as vexatious for a federal court to proceed in a declaratory
judgment suit when another suit is pending in a state court
presenting the same issues, not governed by federal law, between
the same parties."5 5 Clearly, then, if it would be "economical" for
4, 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1976).
48 285 U.S. 413 (1932).
49 See text at note 30 supra.
50 285 U.S. at 422-23 (dictum).
51 Id. at 423-24.
52 Id. at 423 n.6 (citing Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-Ameri-
can Law, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1929)).
53 316 U.S. 491 (1942).
- 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1976).
5 316 U.S. at 495.
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the district court to proceed, it should do so; the Court did not
hold that declaratory relief was never available if the same parties
were involved in litigation pending before a state court. In order to
aid federal courts in this balancing of economies, the Court ex-
plained that it would be proper to inquire into the scope of the
pending state suit, the defenses available, whether the claims of all
parties could be disposed of, and whether necessary parties had
been or could be joined.58
Langnes, as noted, arguably is special because of the policy
underlying the savings clause in the statute conferring admiralty
jurisdiction.5 7 The same is true of Canada Malting because the liti-
gation was entirely between foreigners, and of Brillhart because of
the peculiarly discretionary nature of declaratory relief. Neverthe-
less, taken together, these cases demonstrate a willingness to ac-
cept the propriety of a balancing of equities in order to avoid the
waste inherent in duplicative litigation. The Fifth Circuit agrees
with this conclusion: "Brillhart and cases decided after it. . . have
made manifest a policy against dual litigation which. . . has given
rise to a discretionary power in the federal courts to stay proceed-
ings in equity suits in deference to a parallel state action. '58
2. Express Approval of Balancing. The balancing approach
implicit in Langnes, Canada Malting, and Brillhart was expressly
approved in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United
States.59 There the government brought a water rights suit in the
federal district court, and subsequently was joined in a similar suit
in state court. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dis-
missal of the federal suit.
Speaking for the Court, Justice Brennan reviewed the first
three categories of abstention. Concluding that none was relevant
to the case at bar, he nevertheless found the dismissal proper:
"[T]here are principles unrelated to considerations of proper con-
stitutional adjudication and regard for federal-state relations
which govern in situations involving the contemporaneous exercise
of concurrent jurisdictions. . . . These principles rest on consider-
ations of '[w]ise judicial administration, giving regard to conserva-
tion of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of
86 Id.
See text and note at note 47 supra.
68 PPG Indus., Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 478 F.2d 674, 679 (5th Cir. 1973) (footnote
omitted).
58 424 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1976); see Comment, supra note 26, at 659-64.
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litigation.' "60
In affirming the dismissal in this case, the Court relied heavily
on the policy it found to underlie the McCarran amendment,61 by
which the United States consents to suit in cases involving water
rights: "The clear federal policy evinced by that legislation is the
avoidance of piecemeal adjudication of water rights .... ,,62 While
such a policy is implicit in the McCarran amendment, the avoid-
ance of multiple litigation and the consequent possibility of incon-
sistent results is the sole policy underlying the Federal Inter-
pleader Act. Thus if the policy found by the Court to underlie the
McCarran amendment justifies abstention for reasons of wise judi-
cial administration, then, a fortiori, such abstention should be per-
missible in interpleader suits as well.
The Court in Colorado River also cited Brillhart as illustrative
of the general propriety of avoiding piecemeal litigation,63 and
mentioned two other factors to be weighed in assessing whether to
dismiss a suit: the inconvenience of the federal forum, and the or-
der in which jurisdiction was obtained by the concurrent forums."
The Court concluded that "[n]o one factor is necessarily determi-
native; a carefully considered judgment taking into account both
the obligation to exercise jurisdiction and the combination of fac-
tors counselling against that exercise is required. ' 65 This language
establishes beyond dispute that Colorado River legitimizes a bal-
ancing approach to abstention for reasons of wise judicial
administration.
III. THE CONTENT OF THE BALANCING TEST
Federal court deference to duplicative state court litigation as-
sumes, of course, that the parallel state suit is adequate to protect
the interests of the litigants. Thus the threshold inquiry concerns
the degree of protection afforded the parties should they be rele-
gated to the state forum exercising concurrent jurisdiction: is there
an "adequate" remedy "at law"? A finding that the pending state
proceedings are in some way inadequate to protect a stakeholder
40 424 U.S. at 817 (quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180,
183 (1952)).
41 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1976).
62 424 U.S. at 819.
43 Id. at 818.
" Id.
61 Id. at 818-19. See also Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 663-67 (1978).
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faced with inconsistent claims would of necessity preclude a stay
or dismissal in deference to those proceedings; were it otherwise,
the Supreme Court would soon be deciding Dunlevy all over again.
Once this threshold is crossed-that is, once the protection af-
forded the parties by the state suit is found to be adequate-the
balancing test will determine the propriety of a stay or dismissal of
the federal interpleader suit in deference to those proceedings.
On the one hand there is the "virtually unflagging obliga-
tion""6 of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction conferred
upon them; on the other there may be a congeries of factors coun-
selling against such exercise. When the latter factors outweigh the
obligation to decide the suit, the district court may stay or dismiss
it. Giving precise content to both halves of this equation is a sim-
ple matter. First, the "virtually unflagging" duty can be defined in
terms of the degree of permissiveness or compulsion inherent in
the grant of interpleader jurisdiction, as manifested in the nature
of the remedy and the legislative history. Second, considerations of
wise judicial administration require a finding only as to which suit
will more efficiently and completely dispose of the litigation.
A. The Threshold Inquiry: Is There an Adequate State Remedy?
Virtually all federal courts that have stayed their own pro-
ceedings in deference to parallel state litigation have required
some showing, or have at least asserted, that the pending state pro-
ceedings are adequate to protect the rights of all the parties.6 7
Conversely, deference to state proceedings is found to be inappro-
priate if those proceedings are for any reason inadequate to render
a full adjudication of the matter in controversy. 8 In affirming the
dismissal in Brillhart, the Supreme Court gave some guidance as
to the proper scope of this inquiry. A decision as to whether the
controversy can better be settled in the pending state suit would
424 U.S. at 817.
67 E.g., Home Indem. Co. v. Moore, 499 F.2d 1202, 1205 (8th Cir. 1974); Koehring Co. v.
Hyde Constr. Co., 424 F.2d 1200, 1202-04 (7th Cir. 1970); B.J. Van Ingen & Co. v. Connolly,
225 F.2d 740, 743 (3d Cir. 1955); Zellen v. Second New Haven Bank, 454 F. Supp. 1359, 1364
(D. Conn. 1978); Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Cooper, 328 F. Supp. 1126, 1127 (W.D.
Okla. 1971); Agricultural Ins. Co. v. Lido of Worcester, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 799, 802 (D. Mass.
1945); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Egeline, 30 F. Supp. 738, 741 (N.D. Cal. 1939).
"E.g., Austin v. Texas-Ohio Gas Co., 218 F.2d 739, 746 (5th Cir. 1955); National Fire
Ins. Co. v. Sanders, 38 F.2d 212, 214-15 (5th Cir. 1930); Kulovitz v. Illinois High School
Ass'n, 462 F. Supp. 875, 877 & n.2 (N.D. IMI. 1978); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 400 F. Supp. 888, 889-90 (N.D. Ill. 1975), a/l'd, 541 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1976); Jeffer-
son Std. Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 161 F. Supp. 679, 680-81 (E.D.S.C. 1956).
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properly entail an "inquiry into the scope of the pending state
court proceeding and the nature of the defenses open there," and
"[t]he federal court may have to consider whether the claims of all
parties in interest can satisfactorily be adjudicated in that pro-
ceeding, whether necessary parties have been joined, [or] whether
such parties are amenable to process in that proceeding . ... 69
At least one court has gone so far as to place the burden of
showing the inadequacy of the state proceeding on the party op-
posing the stay.70 This hardly seems appropriate in view of the
"virtually unflagging" obligation of the federal courts to decide
cases properly before them; in interpleader suits, however, this ob-
ligation is not so strong as it is when the action is one brought
under the general diversity statute. Thus it would seem fair, at
least in suits brought under the Federal Interpleader Act, to place
the burden of showing inadequacy of the state court proceedings
on the party responsible for bringing the duplicative federal suit.7 1
It is not difficult to determine the adequacy of relief afforded
the parties when the state court has already rendered judgment;7 2
this is true if the decision has been announced, even though steps
such as entry of the decree remain to be taken.73 In this situation it
is plain that the purpose of the federal statute has been accom-
plished without the necessity of its application. 4
This is also true when all necessary parties are already before
the state court. The federal interpleader statute was enacted in re-
sponse to the situation presented by the Dunlevy case, 5 where no
state court had the power to compel appearance by all claimants.
When all parties have appeared in the state suit, either voluntarily
or in response to valid service of process, the necessity for the in-
vocation of the federal remedy disappears. 6 The federal court can
69 Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491, 495 (1942).
70 Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Tishman Realty & Constr. Co., 72 F.R.D. 33, 41 & n.12
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("plaintiff makes no claim" that all issues not in state court, or state court
unable to resolve them).
71 This will ordinarily be the same party opposing the motion to stay or dismiss.
71 See, e.g., B.J. Van Ingen & Co. v. Connolly, 225 F.2d 740, 745 (3d Cir. 1955) (state
court judgment entered one day before federal interpleader filed, so dismissal proper).
73 See, e.g., General Exporting Co. v. Star Transfer Line, 136 F.2d 329, 334 (6th Cir.
1943) (district court properly dismissed interpleader suit when state court had announced
decision, although it had not entered decree, before federal suit was filed), cert. denied, 323
U.S. 724 (1944).
74 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Egeline, 30 F. Supp. 738, 741 (N.D. Cal. 1939).
71 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916). See text and notes at notes
10-11 supra.
71 Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Cooper, 328 F. Supp. 1126, 1127 (W.D. Okla. 1971);
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require affidavits showing that service has been achieved on all
parties;7 7 if one or more parties in the state suit are challenging
personal service on them, and that challenge remains unresolved,
dismissal has nevertheless been ordered on the basis that the state
suit is in rem.7 8
The lower courts have disagreed on the propriety of a stay or
dismissal when not all parties are before the state court. Some
have refused to defer to the state suit without further inquiry;7 9
others have deferred on a showing that all necessary parties not
yet present in the state suit can be brought into that proceeding.80
This latter approach is expressly approved in Brillhart, where the
Court deemed it proper to consider not only whether all necessary
parties had been joined but also whether such parties were amena-
ble to process."1
Once it has been determined that all parties necessary for a
just adjudication have been or can be joined in concurrent state
proceedings, the federal court must ascertain whether any relevant
issues are foreclosed by applicable procedural or substantive state
law. Procedural rules are more likely to present obstacles, as not
all states have imitated the liberality of the federal interpleader
statute. It is possible, for instance, that the state does not allow
interpleader by way of defense, counterclaim or cross-claim as does
the federal statute,"2 but only as an original bill in equity. It is also
possible that state rules require the stakeholder to be completely
disinterested; under the Federal Act the stakeholder is allowed to
assert defenses as to one or more of the stakeholders 83 In either
situation it should be fairly clear that the state proceedings are
incapable of affording full relief, and a stay or dismissal would be
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Egeline, 30 F. Supp. 738, 741 (N.D. Cal. 1939).
7 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Egeline, 30 F. Supp. 738, 740 (N.D. Cal. 1939).
78 Zellen v. Second New Haven Bank, 454 F. Supp. 1359, 1362, 1366 (D. Conn. 1978).
79 E.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 400 F. Supp. 888, 889 (N.D. Ill.
1975), aff'd, 541 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1976); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. A.S. Reid & Co., 16
F.2d 502, 503 (E.D. Pa. 1926). Cf. Jefferson Std. Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 161 F. Supp. 679, 680
(E.D.S.C. 1956) (mere assertion that a party not in the state suit could be impleaded held
insufficient to justify abstention).
so Cf. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bailey, 308 F. Supp. 1251, 1253 (N.D.W. Va. 1970)
(employees could intervene in the state suit; if they did not, company could have them
brought in as indispensable third parties); Agricultural Ins. Co. v. Lido of Worcester, Inc.,
63 F. Supp. 799, 802 (D. Mass. 1945) (parties missing from the state suit "may be
impleaded").
81 See text at note 69 supra.
82 FED. R. Cirv. P. 22(1).
8- 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a) (1976).
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improper. One court has held that the stakeholder was not ade-
quately "protected" until a court of competent jurisdiction had is-
sued a valid order discharging him from liability."4 In the case of a
bill in the nature of interpleader, however, the stakeholder wishes
to remain in court to assert defenses against one or more of the
claimants, so such a holding requires too much.
B. Balancing
Once the threshold inquiry by the court has established the
adequacy of the state remedy, the court may balance diverse fac-
tors to determine whether to accept interpleader jurisdiction.
1. Interpleader Jurisdiction Is Permissive. In order to make
the balancing involved at all meaningful, it is first necessary to give
content to the "virtually unflagging obligation" faced by the fed-
eral courts under the particular jurisdictional grant involved. Con-
gress conceivably could confer jurisdiction on the federal courts for
reasons or under circumstances that do not indicate a mandate,
but rather a permissive grant. The argument is that, given the rea-
sons for a particular grant of jurisdiction, as manifested in the leg-
islative history, it should be possible to determine just how "un-
flagging" is the obligation facing the district court, once the
jurisdiction has been properly invoked.
In contrast to the.absolute right doctrine, which interprets all
congressional grants of jurisdiction as mandatory, this analysis dis-
tinguishes among the various grants. Professor Chafee argued that,
as with any equitable remedy, interpleader should not be granted
when the parties have an adequate remedy at law.85 In conformity
with this principle it has been held that interpleader under the
Federal Act should be allowed only when it appears that the rem-
edy is necessary, that is, when the petitioner has no adequate legal
remedy.8 6
Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co. of America,8 7 in which the
Court affirmed dismissal of a suit asking declaratory relief, was a
diversity case. While it has been noted88 that the Federal Declara-
" Jefferson Std. Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 161 F. Supp. 679, 680 (E.D.S.C. 1956).
8S Chafee, Modernizing Interpleader, supra note 19, at 821. See also Klaber v. Mary-
land Cas. Co., 69 F.2d 934, 936 (8th Cir. 1934) ("The true origin of [interpleader] jurisdic-
tion is that there is no remedy at law or that the legal remedy is inadequate").
88 Preston Corp. v. Raese, 236 F. Supp. 135 (N.D.W. Va. 1964), aff'd, 377 F.2d 263 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967).
- 316 U.S. 491 (1942).
" Id. at 494.
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tory Judgments Act is permissive in its terms, and the Interpleader
Act is not,89 the analogy of that Act to the Interpleader Act is nev-
ertheless compelling. Both interpleader and declaratory judgment
are remedies; as the Court pointed out in Brillhart, if the contro-
versy could be fully adjudicated in the pending state proceeding,
federal declaratory relief would be unwarranted. 0 The declaratory
remedy was provided because a party could not be deemed to have
an adequate remedy if required "to violate or purport to violate a
statute in order to obtain a judicial determination of its meaning
or validity."'91
Congress provided for relief by interpleader for similar rea-
sons. In either situation, the party seeking invocation of the rem-
edy is in an unconscionable position: the party faces either crimi-
nal sanctions or double liability, while it is incapable of securing
prior and adequate determination of legal rights. Whatever the
reasons underlying the grant of general diversity jurisdiction, fed-
eral interpleader was made available because a stakeholder had no
adequate legal remedy when faced with conflicting claims asserted
by parties not amenable to service of process in a single state juris-
diction. 92 Professor Chafee argued that to interpret the grant of
interpleader jurisdiction as permissive was in conformity with the
purpose of the Federal Interpleader Act of 1936,1s which was "that
the United States courts should be given power to settle all inter-
pleader cases that cannot be handled by the state courts. 9 4
Chafee also interpreted the act as intending to "leave the district
courts free to use their discretionary powers to refuse relief and
send the stakeholder to another forum, whenever the facts make
such a course just and convenient."95
A final reason for construing federal interpleader jurisdiction
as permissive rather than mandatory is highlighted by Colorado
9 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1976) ("any court of the United States ... may declare
the rights... of any interested party" (emphasis added)) with 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a) (1976)
("The District Courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action of interpleader"
(emphasis added)).
8o Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491, 495 (1942).
1 S. REP. No. 1005, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 203 (1934).
82 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 660, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1916); S. REP. No. 558, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2-4 (1936).
" Act of June 20, 1936, ch. 13, 49 Stat. 1096 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 1397,
2361 (1976)).
I" Chafee, The Federal Interpleader Act of 1936 (pt. 1), supra note 19, at 975 (empha-
sis added).
"I Id. at 985.
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River. In that case the Court relied heavily on the clear federal
policy of avoiding piecemeal adjudication of water rights evinced
by the McCarran amendment, adding that "[t]his policy is akin to
that underlying the rule requiring that jurisdiction be yielded to
the court first acquiring control of property, for the concern in
such instances is with avoiding the generation of additional litiga-
tion through permitting inconsistent dispositions of property."'96
However appropriate the analogy to the in rem rule may have been
with respect to the McCarran amendment,97 it is particularly com-
pelling with respect to interpleader. The avoidance of piecemeal
adjudication, with the consequent possibility of multiple or incon-
sistent liabilities, is the primary goal of the device; indeed, the his-
tory of interpleader as an equitable remedy demonstrates beyond
question that its evolution was a response to precisely those con-
siderations.98 These considerations leave no doubt that federal ju-
risdiction under the interpleader statute is permissive to the extent
that the rationale for invoking it is absent in any particular case.
2. Convenience to the Courts and to the Parties. In order to
complete the balancing process, considerations of "wise judicial ad-
ministration" will dictate whether deference to state proceedings is
appropriate. The factors that a court should consider can be
grouped into two categories: those relevant to the conservation of
judicial resources, and those concerning convenience and fairness
to litigants.99
a. Judicial economy. Few would deny that it is in the public
interest to avoid the waste of judicial resources.100 Especially in
light of the constantly expanding workload of the federal courts,
avoidance of unnecessary duplication of judicial effort should have
a high priority.10 1 In other contexts, the Supreme Court has held
that in its sound discretion a court of equity may refuse to protect
private rights when the exercise of its jurisdiction would be preju-
" Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 819 (1976).
97 The dissenters thought the analogy inapposite. Id. at 822 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
8 See text and notes at notes 8-9 supra.
" Aetna State Bank v. Altheimer, 430 F.2d 750, 755 (7th Cir. 1970); Mottolese v. Kauf-
man, 176 F.2d 301, 303 (2d Cir. 1949) (L. Hand, C.J.). Cf. Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S.
248, 254 (1936) (same grounds govern stays in deference to parallel proceedings in another
district court).
100 Comment, Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States: An In-
creased Role for State Courts in the Adjudication of Federal Reserved Water Rights, 1977
UTAH L. REV. 315, 328.
1o See Aetna State Bank v. Altheimer, 430 F.2d 750, 755-56 (7th Cir. 1970); authorities
cited note 7 supra.
[47:824
Federal Interpleader Actions
dicial to the public interest. 102 There is a clear public interest in
the availability of a system of courts not overcrowded by the pres-
ence of numerous duplicative suits.103 Thus, while docket conges-
tion does not, standing alone, justify deference to parallel state
proceedings, the reduction in case load is an ancillary benefit to be
derived from an otherwise justified stay or dismissal.1 04
Mere priority in time of the state suit is not a sufficiently pre-
cise substitute for determining whether deference will result in a
gain in judicial economy;105 the state court docket might be more
or less congested than the federal. What is needed, rather, is some
rough estimate of the relative progress of the parallel suits, as well
as an assessment of the relative likelihood of prompt disposition in
the two forums. 10 8 As Professor Currie has succinctly noted, "[a]
race to the courthouse is arbitrary and unseemly, but it is no more
so than the present race to judgment in two suits filed one after
the other, and it involves a good deal less waste.110 7
An important benefit of deference to concurrent proceedings is
the avoidance of delay. While delay is one of the horrors involved
in preservation of the right to return to federal court in the first
two categories of abstention,10 8 the avoidance of delay is one of the
primary considerations in the determination of whether to stay or
dismiss for reasons of wise judicial administration.109
102 E.g., Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176, 185 (1935); United States ex rel.
Greathouse v. Dern, 289 U.S. 352, 360 (1933).
103 E.g., Universal Gypsum, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 390 F. Supp. 824, 828-29
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). "Litigants who have no other forum available to them should not be asked
to stand aside while we engage in diversity litigation which is duplicative of that pending in
a state court of competent jurisdiction." Id. at 830.
104 See Weiner v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 521 F.2d 817, 820 (9th Cir. 1975); Atchison
v. Nelson, 460 F. Supp. 1102, 1109 (D. Wyo. 1978).
115 E.g., Zellen v. Second New Haven Bank, 454 F. Supp. 1359 (D. Conn. 1978);
Chintala v. Diamond Reo Trucks, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 1392, 1394 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
I" Cf. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Tishman Realty & Constr. Co., 72 F.R.D. 33, 41 n.12
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (likelihood of prompt disposition in alternative forum a factor); Bandag,
Inc. v. Saliga, 314 F. Supp. 432, 435 (D. Md. 1970) (state court trial calendar permits
prompt trial, which is one factor in determining that stay is nonprejudicial).
1'7 Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute (pt. 2), 36 U. Cm. L.
REv. 268, 335 (1969). See also Weiner v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 521 F.2d 817, 820 (9th
Cir. 1975) (dual litigation might involve courts in an unseemly race to judgment).
'" See, e.g., England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 419
(1964); id. at 425-26 (Douglas, J., concurring); Currie, supra note 107, at 317.
I" Cf. Augustin v. Mughal, 521 F.2d 1215, 1217 (8th Cir. 1975) (no showing that ab-
stention would cause delay cited as one of the reasons for holding suit was improperly
dismissed).
1980]
The University of Chicago Law Review
The policies underlying the removal statute ° provide further
support for dismissals for reasons of judicial economy. In any case
brought in state court that is within the original jurisdiction of the
federal courts, the defendant(s) may remove to the federal court."'
If the defendant could have removed but did not, and later at-
tempts to circumvent the time limitation on the availability of re-
moval"12 by filing an original bill in the federal court, sound policy
considerations support disallowance of the duplicative suit; Con-
gress has determined that state courts are an adequate forum for
suits not within the removal statute." 3 Some courts have deemed
this an additional factor in determining the propriety of a stay. 4
Finally, all other things being equal, the case for abstention is
particularly strong when applicable state law is unclear." 5 The
suggestion is implicit in Brillhart that the more appropriate forum
is that whose law will be applied.""' Federal judges occasionally
have been moved to remark upon the frustration involved in "pre-
dicting" state law, only to be proven "wrong" by a subsequent rul-
ing of the highest state court." 7 Thus, if other positive reasons jus-
tifying abstention appear, the lack of clarity of the applicable state
law may appropriately serve to tip the scales affirmatively in favor
of abstention.
b. Convenience and fairness to litigants. It has been com-
mon for the lower federal courts to consider the burden placed on
litigants who have to prosecute or defend more than one lawsuit in
courts of concurrent jurisdiction." 8 There is ample precedential as
10 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1451 (1976).
' Id. § 1441(a). This procedure is followed unless the case is based solely on diversity
of citizenship, and one or more of the defendants is a citizen of the state where the action is
brought. Id. § 1441(b).
112 The defendant must seek removal within 30 days of his receipt of a copy of the
initial pleading. Id. § 1446(b).
"I Examples are federal defenses and local defendants in diversity cases. See Com-
ment, supra note 26, at 666-71.
n1 E.g., Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Reins. Co., 459 F. Supp. 859, 862 n.3,
864 (N.D. Ill. 1978), aff'd, 600 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1979).
JIB See Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 544 F.2d 624, 629 (2d Cir. 1976).
110 Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491, 495 (1942). See Universal Gyp-
sum, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 390 F. Supp. 824, 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("Their resolu-
tion will be controlled by the applicable precedents of New York contract law whether the
trial is had in this courthouse or across the street"); D. CuRRIE, supra note 5, at 681.
n, E.g., United Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483, 486 (5th Cir.) (Brown, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 935 (1964).
118 See, e.g., Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Tishman Realty & Constr. Co., 72 F.R.D. 33, 41
& n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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well as statutory119 support for the consideration of this factor, in
situations involving the doctrines of pendent jurisdiction 20 and fo-
rum non conveniens. 121 Additional support is derived from the ar-
gument of Professor Chafee that the Interpleader Act allows the
district court to dismiss the suit and direct the parties to begin
anew elsewhere, if considerations of justice and convenience so re-
quire.1 22 What is important here is the relative convenience of the
alternative forum, as measured by ease of access for geographically
diverse parties and witnesses.
Another consideration involves the relative weight to be given
to the forum choice of the various parties. With strict interpleader
it is particularly appropriate to vindicate the forum choice of a
claimant rather than that of the stakeholder, because the latter
will be discharged upon establishing entitlement to the remedy
and payment of the fund into court. The venue provisions of the
Federal Act require suit to be brought in a district in which one or
more of the claimants reside.12 3 This supports the inference that,
while federal interpleader was necessary to alleviate the Dunlevy
problem, an insurer, for example, would not be allowed to use the
newly available forum to the disadvantage of the claimants. It is a
short step from that proposition to the conclusion that, if a claim-
ant has chosen a state forum prior to institution of the federal in-
terpleader suit, that choice should be vindicated absent any neces-
sity for invocation of the federal jurisdiction.
Courts have refused to allow abuse of the legal system when it
appears that the federal suit is a purely reactive defensive maneu-
ver, or a vexatious suit.12 4 In either case the courts should not lend
their sanction to forum shopping, wasteful maneuvering, delaying
tactics, or coerced settlements derived from the dual burden
placed on litigants by duplicative litigation. Public policy presents
strong support for furnishing district judges with the means by
which to prevent such improper use of the federal courts.12 5
--1 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976) (change of name for the convenience of parties and
witnesses).
120 See UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947).
" See Chafee, The Federal Interpleader Act of 1936 (pt. 1), supra note 19, at 974-75.
12 28 U.S.C. § 1397 (1976). Cf. Chintala v. Diamond Reo Trucks, Inc., 393 F. Supp.
1392 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (initial choice of forum alone not determinative).
124 E.g., Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Reins. Co., 459 F. Supp. 859, 861-62
(N.D. IM. 1978), afl'd, 600 F.2d 1228, 1236 (7th Cir. 1979).
'" See generally Currie, supra note 107, at 335; Kurland, Toward a Cooperative Judi-
cial Federalism: The Federal Court Abstention Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481, 491 (1959). Both
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It should be noted that considerations of convenience to liti-
gants will rarely, if ever, be determinative of the decision of the
federal court whether to stay or proceed, if the balancing pro-
gresses in the proper order. Assuming that the threshold require-
ment of adequate state proceedings is met, the court first should
determine which suit is the more economical in terms of judicial
economy. If the state suit is found to allow the more expeditious
disposition of the litigation, the federal court will stay its hand; if
the federal suit is the more economical, the district court is ex-
pressly authorized by the Interpleader Act to enjoin the litigants
from proceeding further in the state suit.126 In either case, only one
suit will go forward, thus ensuring that, whichever suit proceeds to
judgment, the parties are freed from the burdens inherent in pros-
ecuting or defending more than one suit over the same controversy.
A brief comment on the practicability of the balancing test
outlined above is in order. Unlike so many areas where balancing is
required, the nature and content of this test allow for both preci-
sion and predictability. The court is required to balance factors of
judicial economy and convenience to litigants only after it has been
shown that either of the parallel suits is capable of protecting the
interests of all the parties. It is then a relatively simple matter to
determine which can do so more economically; the other suit then
will cease.
Two further matters deserve mention. First, once the determi-
nation has been made that deference to a parallel state suit is war-
ranted, the federal court must decide whether to retain jurisdiction
or to dismiss the interpleader suit outright.127 The advantage of a
stay is obvious: since jurisdiction over the federal interpleader is
thereby retained, the stay can be modified or discontinued and the
state interpleader enjoined, should it develop that the state pro-
ceeding is in fact inadequate to protect all parties, 128 or that, for
whatever reason, the federal suit can be disposed of more expedi-
Professors Currie and Kurland argue that the Judicial Code should be amended to provide
for stays in this situation.
126 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1976).
127 Some courts, rather than staying or dismissing the duplicative action, have "abated"
it. E.g., Baer v. Fahnestock & Co., 565' F.2d 261, 263 (3d Cir. 1977); Weiner v. Shearson,
Hammill & Co., 521 F.2d 817, 820-21 (9th Cir. 1975). Because the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure do not provide for abatement, this discussion concerns only the propriety of stays
as opposed to dismissals.
128 See Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Reins. Co., 459 F. Supp. 859, 861 (N.D.
IlM. 1978), afl'd, 600 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1979).
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tiously.12 9 The parties remain free to petition the court for modifi-
cation of the stay order in the event that circumstances change.130
Second, a stay order ordinarily is not appealable, because it is
not a final judgment.'3 ' To treat a stay in this context as an ap-
pealable final judgment would be unjustified both in light of the
policy of the final judgment rule, and because the parties remain
free to petition for discontinuance of the stay order.3 2 It would
effectively negate any gain in judicial economy if the parties simply
moved up to a court of appeals, while continuing to litigate the
state interpleader.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Interpleader Act was passed to aid the stake-
holder who, when faced with diverse claimants to a single fund,
could not force all parties to join in a single suit. It is perfectly
consistent with this congressional intent to restrict the availability
of the federal remedy to situations in which that inability of the
stakeholder is not remedied by the presence of all necessary par-
ties in a single suit pending in a state court of competent jurisdic-
tion. 3 This conclusion leads to substantial ancillary benefits:
avoidance of federal-state friction caused by unnecessary interfer-
ence by injunction with the orderly processes of state courts, free-
dom of litigants from the burdens of duplicative litigation, relief
from overcrowded dockets, and more efficient use of scarce judicial
resources.
Mark W. Smith
See, e.g., Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407, 409-10 (1965) (per curiam); Langnes v.
Green, 282 U.S. 531, 541-42 (1931).
1so Applegate v. Devitt, 509 F.2d 106, 109 & n.2 (8th Cir. 1975).
. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976).
132 Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 665 (1978).
3 See Zellen v. Second New Haven Bank, 454 F. Supp. 1359, 1365-66 (D. Conn. 1978):
"The state court interpleader currently pending is in a position to comprehensively dispose
of all the potential litigation . . . while facilitating the most efficient allocation of judicial
resources and relieving the [stakeholder] of the unfairness of litigating the same action in
two different courts (an abuse of the judicial system interpleader suits are intended to
forestall)."
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